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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
March 14, 1980 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 Cert to U.S. Ct. Cus.& Pat. 
Apps (Rich, for ct) No. 79-1112-COX 
DIAMOND (Comm'r Patents) 
' 
v. 
DIEHR Federal/civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY. Whether a new process for calculating the 
cure time for molded rubber products, involving use of a -computer to \constantly ) recalculatel cure time is patentable 
subject matter under 35 u.s.c. § 101. 
2. FACTS. Rubber products from a molded press must be 
cured in the press for a certain time, depending on the 
temperature inside the press. Uncontrolled variables make it 
difficult to arrive at an exact temperature for purposes of 
calculating the cure time. The time the press is open while 
'-?,-.$~~- ,.p ~~A ,-~ 7t'""T~ °1f2( ~~-&~ 
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- - 2 - -being loaded affects the temperature inside and thus influences 
the time it takes the press to heat to the desired 
temperature. Industry practice has been to assume a 
"reasonable amount of mold-opening time" during loading and 
unloading. This often results in overcuring or undercuring, 
since the calculations can only be as precise as the 
temperature estimations. 
Diehr's claimed invention makes calculation of the cure 
time much more accurate. The invention involves taking 
continuous· (for example, every ten seconds) temperature 
readings from inside the closed press and feeding these 
readings into a digital computer. The computer then uses a 
well - known mathematical formula, the Arrhenius equation, to 
continuously recalculate the cure time based on the actual 
( 
- temperature in the mold. When the proper time has elapsed, the 
-
computer opens the door of the mold. 
The patent examiner rejected Diehr's .invention as drawn to 
nonstatutory subject matter under 35 u.s.c. § 101. Those steps 
carried out by computer are nonpatentable under Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, and the remaining steps which relate to 
the me thod of manufacturing molded articles, such as opening, 
closing and heating of the mold -- are "conventional." 
The PTO Board of Appeals affirmed. The constant 
measurement of the mold temperature was within the prior art, 
and the method of calculating the cure time was a nonpatentable 
mathematical algorithm. 
..... -~ -fl' 
- - 3 - -3. OPINION BELOW. The CCPA reversed. It first noted that 
-: .. 
- - resps strenuously disputed the factual conclusion made by both 
the examiner and the board that the step of continuously 
measuring the temperature inside the mold is old in the art. 
Resps also argued that the PTO erred by dissecting their claims 
into novel and nonnovel elements. 
Ce 
• 
The CCPA was "inclined to agree with [resps] that the 
record is devoid of any evidence that [the step of continually 
measuring the temperature in the mold cavit~ was ever performed 
by persons other than [resps] ." Petn 13a. However, the court 
found this issue to be irrelevant. Considerations of novelty 
and obviousness have no bearing on compliance with§ 101. Thus 
it was error for the Board to divide up the claim into novel 
and nonnovel parts. The focus should be on whether is claim as 
a whole is directed to a method of calculation or a 
mathematical formula. 
The CCPA found that resps' claim was ·not an attempt to 
patent a mathematical formula. Granting of resps' patent would 
not precude others from using the Arrhenius equation. Resps 
claimed a process for molding rubber articles, which improved 
previous processes by opening the door at exactly the proper 
time. 
4. CONTENTIONS. 
\/2he SG contends that this is the second time in 




538 (1978). The SG suggests that this case be considered in 




~~ ........ - ·«• · 
- - 4 - -
The SG finds Flook indistinguishable. The application 
r 
~- there described a three-step method for a computer to update 
the alarm limits in catalytic conversion processes. The steps 
were measurement of the present value of the process variable, 
for example, temperature; use of a mathematical formula in a 
computer to calculate an updated alarm value; and adjustment of 
the alarm value to the updated value. The application at issue 
here also describes a three-itep process: measurement of the 
present value of the process variable, temperature; use of a 
mathematical formula in a computer to calculate an updated cure 
time; and direction of the mold press to open in accordance 
with the updated time. The Board performed the proper analysis 
when it isolated the computer algorithm from the rest of the 
Ce 
<e 
claim and then rejected the claim because what remained was old 
in the art. 
The basis of the CCPA's conclusion was that "as a whole" 
the claim stated "a process involving the manipulation of 
apparatus resulting in chemical and physical change of starting 
material," whose calculation, unlike Flock's was "intimately 
entwined with the rubber molding process recited." Petn 16a, 
17a. 
The SG maintains that the holding below emasculates Flook. 
Flook mandates the analysis performed by the Board. The only 
new element in resps' claim was the use of a computer to 
recalculate cure time. Since the mathematical algorithm cannot 
be patented, the patent application was properly denied. 
• - 5 - -Resps urge that their process is chemical and mechanical, 
·· - not mathematical. They are not attempting to patent a computer 
program. Merely because their new invention has as one of its 
elements use of a computer program does not make it 
unpatentable. Resps' chemical-mechanical process starts with 
uncured rubber and ends with a precisely cured product. 
Ce 
Resps also maintain that considerations of novelty and 
obviousness are inappropriate under § 101. Section 101 is a 
threshold determination. Thus the CCPA was correct in 
rejecting . the PTO's separation of resps' claim into novel and 
nonnovel elements. 
Finally, resps argue that this case should not be 
consolidated with Diamond v. Bradley, supra. The only common 
ground in the two cases is that in each the SG improperly urges 
that an attempt to patent a computer program is involved. 
5. DISCUSSION. In Flook, the claimants attempted to 
patent a new mathematical formula which they discovered. Here, 
resps are attempting to patent the idea of combining a 
thermometer with a computer. The only distinction I see 
between this case and Flook is that resps here, unlike resps in 
Flook, do not concede that all the elements of their invention 
other than the formula are nonnovel. They argued below that 
taking continuous temperature readings was a novel idea. The 
Court in Flook stated: "Even though a phenomenon of nature or 
mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive 
application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the 
• discovery of such a ph e nome non cannot support a patent unless 
the r e is some other inventive concep t in its application. Here 





• - 6 -' ' • • clear that respondent's application contains no claim of 
patentable invention. The chemical processes involved in 
catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons are · well known, as are the 
practice of monitoring the chemical process variables, the use 
of alarm limit limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm 
limit values must be recomputed and readjusted, and the use of 
computers for 'automatic monitoring-alarming.'" 437 U.S., at 
594. 
I think the CCPA erred when it concluded that it is 
------. 
irrelevant under § 101 whether resps' idea to take continuous 
temperature readings and to use a computer to recompute the 
cure time was novel. Flook makes this factor relevant. In 
this case as in Bradley, supra, the CCPA has interpreted Flook 
as not requiring segregation of the nonpatentable algorithm and 
examination of the rest of the invention for novelty. I 
( 
recommend granting the petn and consolidating the case with 
Bradley, as suggested in the Preliminary on Bradle_y. 
There is a response. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DA'l'E: 
RE: 
October 11, 1 980 
No. 79-1112, Diamond v. Diehr cD 
Question Presented 
Does 35 U.S.C. § 101 permit the issuance of a patent 
for a process that uses a thermometer linked with a computer 
program to regulate the curing time of rubber products? 
Background 
This case is confusing. But its resolution turns ~ 
principally on an application of a single Supreme Court case, ~ 
- ~ ,__, 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). It is therefore ~d 
instructive to review the analysis contained in Justice Stevens' ~~"-" 
i-r- d 
majority opinion in Flook (which you joined), and Justice ~li 
Stewart's dissenting opinion. 
-
- - 2. 
Flook had developed a "Method for Updating Alarm 
Limits." During the process of catalytic conversion, variables 
such as temperature, air pressure, and flow rates need to be 
watched for abnormal conditions. An "alarm limit" is a number 
derived from these variables that, if outside a certain range, 
reveals hazardous conditions. Traditional computations fail to 
take into account changes in the variables. Flook' s method 
"updates" measurement of variables throughout the process and 
uses an algorithm, or formula, continually to recompute the 
"alarm limit." Although the calculations can be made by pencil 
and paper, the formula is particularly useful if programmed into 
a computer. 
Flock's patent application did not, however, explain 
- what the proper range of "alarm limits" should be, nor did it 
explain a method of automatically triggering an alarm system. 
The sole novel feature of the method was the formula. 
-
In Flook, as in the instant case, patent officials had fu_,_ 
denied a patent, but the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals~ 
fa-~, 
reversed. The Supreme Court in turn reversed. Justice Stevens . 
~
wrote a majority opinion for six justices, which held that "a ce,. p A 
claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a 
specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101," 
id. at 595 n.18, "unless there is some other inventive concept 
in its application," id. at 594. The Flook application, as was 
noted above, contained no novel feature except for the formula 




- - 3. 
Justice Stewart dissented, writing also for the Chief 
Justice and Justice Rehnquist. The dissenters saw the issue as 
"whether a claimed process loses its status of subject-matter 
patentability simply because one step in the process would not 
be patentable subject matter if considered in isolation." Id. 
at 599 (emphasis in original). The Court's reasoning was 
defective, according to the dissenters, because it "import[ed] 
into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty 
and inventiveness." Id. at 600. By focusing on novelty, the 
Court ignored the fact that 
Id. 
~ection 101 is concerned only with subject-
matter patentability. Whether a patent will 
actually issue depends upon the criteria of 
§§ 102 and 103, which include novelty and 
inventiveness, among many others. It may 
well be that under the criteria of §§ 102 
and 103 no patent should issue on the 
process claimed in this case, because of 
anticipation, abandonment, obviousness, or 
for some other reason. But in my view the 
claimed process clearly meets the standards 
of subject-matter patentability of§ 101. 
In sum, the majority recognized that the use of a 
formula, or computer program, did not foreclose a process from 
patentability under§ 101. But the Court seemed to require that 
there be, in addition to a useful application of the 




is new. Thus, as I read Flook, the question of novelty 
~ 
is~ 
~ highly relevant to§ 101 analysis as well as analysis under §§ 
102 and 103. 
-
- - 4. 
Discussion 
Petr, the Commissioner of Patents, contends that this 
case differs from Flook in no significant way. It therefore 
will be useful briefly to describe the technology of II curing 11 
rubber and the improved process sought to be patented. 
Rubber must be cured, or vulcanized, before it can be 
used. The time needed for curing depends on the temperature 
inside the press, which is roughly controlled by a thermostat. 
Other factors relevant to curing time are the geometric 
configuration of the press, and the viscosity of the rubber when 
it enters the press. A well-known formula, called the Arrhenius 
equation, permits calculation of the curing time. That formula, 
however, does not itself yield a precise curing time unless the 
- temperature is constant throughout. But constant temperature is 
impossible to achieve because the thermostat controls the 
temperature only within a range around the desired temperature. 
-
Thus, curing time cannot be determined precisely. This makes 
curing a risky business. If rubber is taken out of the mold too 
soon, it is useless and must be discarded. If left in too long, 
time is wasted and there is minor deterioration of the rubber's 
quality. Because the risk of under curing is greater than the 
risk of overcuring, manufacturers deliberately overcure; that 
is, they leave the rubber in the mold long enough to be certain 
that it is cured even if the actual temperature is on the low 
side of the range permitted by the thermostat. 
I I \l 
Resp Diehr has developed a process that more -------- - --- - -- ----- ~ 
-
- - 5. 
accuratel uring time. Resp installed a special 
~ 
thermometer in the closed press that continuously reports the 
precise temperature inside the press. With each reported 
temperature reading, ~ computer using the Arrhenius equation 
constantly recomputes the necessary curing time. Because the 
precise temperature is known, the precise curing time also is 
known. The computer at the appropriate time signals a device to 
open the mold. Thus, resp's process means that manufacturers no 
longer have to ~ estimat~ ur~ to ensure that 
rubber will not be removed from the mold too soon. 
This process has significant cost advantages. For 
example, resp's employer has increased productivity 20% because 
it no longer must deliberately overcure. Also, the elimination 
- of deliberate overcuring has eliminated the small quality 
deteriorations caused by overcure. Resp claims that his company 
has saved about $400 million in the six years it has been using 
his process. 
-
A. Petr's Arguments 
Petr says this case "is Flook revisited." The only 
step of the process that resp says is novel is that of 
continuously measuring the temperature near the mold. But the 
Patent Board found that this was old, and that the computer 
program -- which clearly is not patentable -- was resp' s sole 
novel "contribution." Flook, therefore, establishes that the 
entire process is nonstatutory subject matter under§ 101. 





- - 6. 
of the process, including its application, that truly is new. 
Flook, 437 U.S. at 594, 595 n.18. Petr says there is none. A 
patent application by Gould & Davis earlier identified a similar 
process and application. The only difference between resp' s 
scheme and that of Gould & Davis is that the point at which the 
temperature is measured. 
Resp's sole contribution, if there is one at all, is 
programming the computer to control the process. But Flook 
established that a computer program itself was insufficient to 
render patentable an otherwise unpatentable process. 
Nor was it sufficient that resp tacked obvious "post-
solution" steps onto the process. Patentability does not turn 
on the draftsmenship of the claim. 
B. Resp's Arguments 
Resp emphatically argues that it is not attempting to 
patent a ----------- It is attempting to patent a process 
that happens to work best when a computer is used. Resp tacitly 
concedes that language in Flook may have introduced the question 
of novelty into the§ 101 inquiry. Resp therefore argues in the 
alternative that (1) novelty should be irrelevant under § 101, 
and (2) even if novelty is relevant, the process is novel 
because it involves continuously measuring the actual 
temperature without distorting the mold~d rubber. 
(1) Petr says that novelty is irrelevant for 
essentially the same reasons argued by Justice Stewart in his 
Flook dissent: novelty is properly only at issue in§§ 102 and 
- - 7. 
- 1 0,3. 
-
-
(2) Even if novelty is relevant, it is present here. -
The Gould & Davis patent did not measure temperature the same 
way. Gould & Davis measured temperature inside the molded item. 
That is entirely inappropriate for rubber items that must 
conform to precise specifications, because the thermometer's 
presence distorts the shape of the item. Resp says its method 
measures temperature closely adjacent to, but not inside the 
mold. Thus, its measurement device is sufficiently new to 
render the entire process sufficiently new. 
C. CEiticism & Analysis 
there was much merit to 
~w 
~ I would have though that 
Justice Stewart's dissent in Flook. ~-It seems to me that novelty ~ 
ought to be irrelevant to the § 101 inquiry. Novelty can be 
assessed under§§ 102 and 103. The inquiry under§ 101 ought to 
be confined to examining whether the subject matter of the 
process is paten table, assuming novelty arguendo. Flook 
involved the patentability of a process the only novel element 
of which was a computer program. I would have thought that his 
patent should not have been denied as obvious under§ 101, but 
rather under§§ 102 and 103. 
My view, however, seems to have been rejected by the 
Court (and by you) in Flook. That case seems to hold that some 
discrete element of a process involving a computer must be new 
even to be patentable subject matter under§ 101. 
Unless the Court is willing to clarify or reconsider 
-
- - 8. 
Flook, the instant case seems to turn on whether any element of 
resp's process is new. The answer to that question, 
unfortunately, is not well presented for decision on this 
record. Resp says that the placement of the thermometer, and 
its use in permitting continuous calculations, are the novel 
elements of its process. But the Patent Board found that this 
was old. Pet. 24a, 60a. The CCPA, although observing in 
passing that it was "inclined to" think that the Patent Board 
erred in this factual determination, had dismissed the issue as 
irrelevant because "[c]onsiderations of novelty and obviousness 
have no bearing" in the § 101 inquiry. Thus, the CCPA did not 
review the Patent Board's factual finding that the placement and 
measurement aspects of the process were old. If the Court wants 
- to reaffirm Flook, and insist on novelty as an element of the§ 
101 showing, it should remand so that the CCPA can determine 




considerations of novelty and 
obviousness into the § 101 inquiry. Along with the three 
dissenters in that case, I think the Court -- if it meant what 
it said -- was wrong. In any event, the CCPA continues to treat 
those issues as irrelevant in the§ 101 inquiry. The confusion / 
that Flook has created in the patent office and CCPA is 
manifested by this case. The patent off ice found that resp' s 




- - 9. 
placement of the thermometer and system of immediate 
calculations, were old. The CCPA treated novelty as irrelevant 
and reversed. 
If the Court wishes to stand by Flook and all of its 
language, a remand is necessary here to give the CCPA an 
opportunity to review the Patent Board's factual finding on 
novelty. 
My preference, however, would be to clarify Flook and 
affirm. Resp does not want to patent a computer program, but 
rather a process. If the process is old, of course no patent 
should be granted. But the denial should be based on§ 102 or§ 
103; considerations of novelty should not be addressed in § 
101. 
Ellen Richey in her cert annotation to Bradley, the 
companion case to Diehr, concisely summarized the options open 
to the Court. She wrote: 
The CCPA is purposefully disregarding Flook. 
Perhaps they have valid objections. If not, 
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Dear Bill: 
In due course I shall circulate a dissent 
in this case. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
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R. Diehr, II and Theodove 
A. Lutton, 
the United States Couvt 
of Customs anq Pl:l,tent 
Appeals, 
[:N'ovembe:r -, 1980~ 
~ 
11/17 MR, JusTICE REHNQUJ:sT delivered the opinion of the Court, 
We granted certiorari to determine whether a process for /:~ 
curing synthetic rubber which includes in several of its steps r 
the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed digital • 
computer is patentable subject matter under 35 U. S, C, § 101. 
The patent application at is:ue was filed by the respondents ( J ~ 
on August 6, 1975. The claimed invention is a process for ~ _ .. _ • ...4 
molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision 
products. The process uses a mo. Id for precisely shaping the A _ .L) 
uncured material under heat and pressure and then curing~ 
the synthetic rubber in the mold so that the product will 
retain its shape and be functionally operative after the mold-
ing is completed.1 
Respondents claim that their process ensures the produc-
tion of molded articles which are properly cured. Achieving 
1 A "cure" is obtained by mixing curing agents into the uncured polymer 
in advance of molding, and then applying heat over a period of time. If 
the synthetic rubber is cured for the right length of time al the right 




DIAMOND v. DIEHR 
-
the perfect cure depends upon several factors including the 
thickness of the article to be molded, the temperature of the 
molding process, and the amount of time that the article is 
allowed to remain in the press. It is possible using well-
known time, temperature, and cure relationships to calculate 
by means of the Arrhenius equation 2 when to open the press 
and remove the cured product. Nonetheless, according to the 
respondents, the industry has not been able , to obtain uni-
formly accurate cures because the temperature of the molding 
press could not be precisely measured thus making it difficult 
to do the necessary computations to determine cure time.8 
Because the te111perature inside the press has heretofore been 
viewed as an uncontrollable variable, the conventional indus-
try practice has been to calculate the cure time as the shortest 
time in which all parts of the product will definitely be 
cured, assuming a reasonable amount of mold-opening t;me 
during loading and unloading. But the shortcoming of this 
practice is that operating with au uncontrollable variable 
inevitably led in some instances to overestimating the mold-
opening time and overcurmg the rubber, and in other in-
2 The equation i::. named after it,, discoverer Svante Arrhenius and has· 
long been used to calculate the cure time in rubber molding pres;;es The· 
equation can be expressed a.,; follows : 
ln v= CZ+x 
wherein In v is the natural logarithm of v, the total required cure time; 
C is the activation constant, a unique figure for each batch of each com-
pound being molded, determined in accordance with rheometer measure--
rnent:, of each batch ; Z i::, the temperature in the mold ; and x is a con--
stant dependent on the geometry of the particular mold in the press. A 
rheometer is an in,:;trument to mea,mre flow of viscous substance;, . 
3 During the time a press i:; open for loading, it will cool. The longer it 
is open, the cooler it become:, and the longer it takes to re-heat the press 
to the desired temperature range. Thus, the tune necessary to raise the' 
mold temperature to curing temperature is an unpredictable variable. The 
respondents claim lo have overcome thi8 problem by continuously measur~ 
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stances to underestimating that time and undercuring the 
product.4 . 1-
Respondents characterize their contribultin to the art to "Vl 
reside in the process of constantly measuri~ the actual tem-
perature inside the mold. These temperature measurements 
are then automatically fed into a computer which repeatedly 
recalculates the cure time by use of the Arrhenius equation. 
When the recalculated time equals the actual time that has 
elapsed since the press was closed, the computer signals a 
device to open the press. According to the respondents, the 
continuous measuring of the temperature inside the mold 
cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer 
which constantly recalculates the cure time, and the signaling 
by the computer to open the press, are all new in the art. 
The patent examiner rejected the respondents' claims on 
the sole ground that they were drawn to nonstatutory subject 
matter under 35 U. S. C, § 101.° He determined that those 
4 We note that the Government does not seriously contest the respond-
ents' assertions regarding the inability of the i11dustry to obtain accurate 
cures on a uniform ba::;is. See Brief of Petitioner, at 3. 
5 Respondents' application contained 11 different claims. Three exam-
ple,, are claims 1, 2, and 11 which provide : 
"1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded 
compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising : 
"providing said computer with a data base for said press including at 
least, 
"nautral logarithm conversion data (ln) , 
"the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said com-
pound being molded, and 
"a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of 
the press, 
"mitiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the 
press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure, 
''constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location 
closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding, 
"constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z) , 
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steps in respondents' claims that are carried out by a computer 
under control of a stored program constitute nonstatutory 
subject matter under this Court's decision in Gottschalk v. 
each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, which 
is 
"In v=CZ+x 
"where v is the total required cure time, 
" repetitively comparing in the computer at sa.id frequent intervals dur-
ing the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated 
with the Arrhenius equation ru1d said elap:sed time, and 
"opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates 
equivalence. 
"2. The method of claim 1 including measuring the activation energy 
constant for the compouncl being molded in the press with a rheometer 
and automatically updating said data ba:;e within the computer in the 
event of changes in the compound being molded in said pre,;:, as measured 
by said rheometer. 
"11. A method of ma.nufacturing precision molded articles from selected 
synthetic rubber compounds in an openablc rubber molding press having 
at least one heated precision mold, comprising : 
" (a) heating said mold to a. temperature range approximating a pre-
determined rubber curing temperature, 
" (b) installing prepared unmolded synthetic rubber of a known com-
pound in a molding cavity of a predetermmed geometry as defined by said 
mold, 
" (c) closing said pres::i to mold said rubber to occupy said cavity in 
conformance with the contour of said mold and to cure said rubber by 
t ransfer of heat thereto from said mold, 
" ( d) initiating an interval timer upon the closure of said press for moni~ 
toring the elapsed time of said closure, 
" (e) heating said mold during said closure to maintain t he temperature· 
thereof within said range i~pproximating said rubber curing temperature, 
" (f) constantly determining the temperature of said mold at a location 
closely adjacent sa.id cavity thereof throughout closure of said press, 
" (g) repetitively calculating at frequent periodic intervals throughout 
closure of said press the Arrhenius equation for reaction time of said rub-
ber to determine total required cure time v a,, follows: 
''In v=cz+x 
"wherein c i~ an activation energy constant detennined for said rubber 
being molded ru1d cured in said pres:,;, z 1~ the temperature of said mold at. 
-
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Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972) . The remaining steps-install-
ing rubber in the press and the subsequent closing of the 
press-were "conventional in nature and cannot be the basis 
of patentability." The examiner concluded that respondents' 
claims defined and sought protection of a computer program 
for operating a rubber molding press. 
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals agreed 
with the examiner, but the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals reversed. , The court noted that a claim drawn to ______ O 
subject matter otherwise statutory does not beco e-n--: • -
statutory because a computer is i11volved e respondents' 
claims were not directed to a mathematical algorithm or an 
improved method of calculation but rather recited an im-
proved process for molding rubber articles by solving a prac-
tical problem which had arisen in the molding of rubber 
products. 
The Government sought certiorari arguing that the decision 
of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was inconsistent 
with prior decisions of this Court. Because of the import-
ance of the question presented, we granted the writ. 
II 
Last Term in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, ·- U. 
(1980), this Court discussed the historical purposes of the 
patent laws and in particular 35 U. S. C. § 101. As in 
Chakrabarty, we must here construe 35 U. S. C. § 101 which 
provides: -- ---
"Whoever invents or discovers any new or useful process, 
the time of each calculation of said Arrhenius equation, and x j,, a constant 
which is a function of said predetermined geometry of said mold, 
" (h) for each repetition of calculation of said Arrhenius equation herein, 
comparing the resultant calcualted total required cure time with the moni-
tored elapsed time measured by said interval timer, 
" (i) opening said press when a said com1iarisou of calculated total re-
qui red cure time and monitored elapsed time mdicates equivalence, and 
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefrom, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this Title." 6 
In cases of statutory construction, we begin with the lan-
guage of the statute. Unless otherwise defined, "words will 
be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, com-
mon meaning," Perrin v. United States, - U.S. - (1979) , 
and, in dealing with the patent laws, we have more than once 
cautioned that "courts 'should not read into the patent laws 
limitations and conditions which a legislature has not ex-
pressed.' " Dwmond v. Chakrabarty, - U. S., at-, quot-
ing United States v. Dubilier Condensor Corp., 289 U. S. 178, 
199 (1933). 
The Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory subject matter as 
"any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composi-
tion of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof] ." 
Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. Not until the 
patent laws were recodi:fied in 1952 did Congress replace the 
word "art" with the word "process." It is that latter word · 
which we confront today, and in order to determine its mean-
ing we may not be unmindful of the Committee Reports 
accompanying the 1952 Act which inform us that Congress 
intended statutory subject matter to "include anything under 
the sun that is made by man." S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 
2d Sess., 5 (1952) , H . R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., Sec. 2d 
Sess., 6 (1952). 
Although the term "Frocess11 was not add~d to 35 U. S. C. 
§ 101 untiL 1.952, a process has historically enjoyed patent 
protection because it was considered a form of "art" as that 
6 The word "process" is defined ,in 35 U. S. C. § 100 (b): 
"The term 'process' means process, or· method, and includes a new use 
of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition oJ matter, or _ 
material." · · · 
-
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term was used in the 1793 Act.7 In defining the nature of a 
patentable process, the Court stated: 
"That a proces may be patentable, irrespective of the 
particular form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be 
disputed. . . . A process is a mode of treatment of 
7Jn Coming v. Burden, 15 How. 252, 267-268 (1853), this Court 
expla.ined: 
"A process, eo nornine, is not made the subject of a patent in our act of 
Congress. It i5 included under the general term "useful art." An art may 
require one or more proce&~es or machine:, in order to produce a certain 
re,mlt or manufacture The term machine includes every mechru1ical 
device or combination of mechanical power:, and devices to perform some 
function and produce a certain effect or result. But where the result or 
effect is produced by chemical action, by tl1e operation or application of 
ome element or power of nature, or of one substilllce to another, such 
modes, methods, or operations, are called processes. A new process is 
usually the result of discovery ; a machine, of invention. The arts of tan-
ning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting 
ores, illld numerous others, are usually carried on by processes as dis-
tinguished from machines. One may di:ocover a new and useful improve-
ment in the process of tanning, dyeing, &c., irrespective of any particular 
form of machinery or mechanical device. And aJ1other may invent a 
labor-saving machine by which this opera.tion or proce:;s . may be per-
fonned, and each may be entitled to his patent. As, for instance, A has 
discovered that by expo.~iug India rnbber to a certain degree of heat, in 
mixture or connection with certain nwtalic 1:x1lts, he can produce a valuable 
product, or manufacture ; he is entitled to a patent for his discovery, as a 
process or improvement in the art, irrespective of any machine or mechani-
cal device. B, on the contrary, may mvent a new furnace or stove, or 
steam apparatus, by which this process ma.y be carried on with much 
saving of labor, and expensive fuel; and he will be entitled to a patent for 
11is 1michine, as an improvement in the art. Yet A could not have a 
patent for a machine, or B for a. process ; but- each would have a patent 
for the means or method of producing a certain result, or effect, and not 
for the result or effect produced. It is for the discovery or invention of 
some practical method or means of producing a, beneficial re,:mlt or effect, 
t-lmt a patent is granted aml not for the re.-suli, or effect itself. It is when 
the term proce:,1:, is used to represent the means or method of producing a 
result that it is patentable, and 1t will mclude all method:;; or means which 
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certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, 
or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to 
be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. 
If new and useful, it is just as ~ a piece 
of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is 
an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to per-
form the process may or may not be new or patentable; 
whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and 
produce an entirely new result. The process requires 
that certain things should be done with certain sub-
stances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used 
in doing this may be of secondary consequence." Co-
chrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780, 787-788 (1876) . 
Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection 
for a " process" did not ch~ with the add:tion of that 
term to § 101. Recently. in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 
663 (1972) , we repeated the above definition recited in 
Cochrane v. Deener, adding "Transformation and reduction 
of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the 
patentability of a process claim that does not include par-
ticular machines." Id., at 70, 
Analyzing respondents' claims according to the above state-
ments from our cases, we think that._ a physical and chem:cal 
process fo[ molding precision synthetic rubber m oducts falls 
within the ~ 101 categories of possibly patentable subject 
matter. That respondents' claims involve the transforma-
tion of an article, in this ca~ uncured synthetic rubber, 
into a different state or thing cannot be disputed . The re-
spondents' ~ s describe in detail a step-by-step method for 
accomplishing such beginning with the loading of a mold 
with raw uncured rubber and endi11g with the eventual 
opening of the press at the conclusiou of the cure. Industrial 
processes such as this are the type which have historically 
been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.a-










Our conclusion regarding respondents' claims is not altered 
b the fact th;-t in several steps of the process a mathemaf cal 
Tq__u~ n an a programme 1g1 al computer are utilized. 
Courlhas undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and 
every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms. 
Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, 
physical phenomena and abstract ideas. See Parker v. Flook, 
437 U. ""s. 584 (1978); Gottscha1k"'v: Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 67 
(1973) ; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kala Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 
(1948) . "An idea of itself is not patentable," Rubber-Tip 
Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498, 507 (1874). "A principle, 
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause ; 
a motive ; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in 
either of them an exclusive right." Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 
How. 156, 175 (1852) . Only last Term, we explained : 
"[A] new mineral di~covered in the earth or a new plant 
found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Like-
wise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that 
E=mc2 ; nor could Newton have patented the law of 
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.' " 
~ Diamond v. Chakrabarty, - U. S. -, -, quoting 
patent eligibility of processes for curing rubber. See Corning v. Burden, 
15 How, 252, 267 (1853) ; n . 7, supra. In Tilgham v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 
707, 722 (1880) , we referred to the original patent Charles Goodyear re-
ceived on his process for "vulcanizing" or curing rubber. We stated : 
"That a patent can be granted for a proces,;, there can be no doubt. The 
patent law is not confined to new machines and new compositions of mat-
ter, but extends to any new and u,;eful art. or manufacture. A manu~ 
facture is clearly an art, within the meaning of the law. Goodyear's patent 
was for a process, namely, the proce:::s of vulcanizing india-rubber by sub-
jecting it to a high degree of heat when mixed with sulphur and a mineral 
salt. The apparatus for performing the proce,:; was not patented, a.nd was 
not material. The patent pointed out how the process could be effected, 
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Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kala Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 
(1948). 
Our recent holdings in r;;ttschalk v. Benson, supra, and 
~ arker v. Flook, supra, both of which are computer-related, 
stand for no more than these long established principles. 
In Benson, we held unpatentable claims for an algorithm 
used toconvert binary code decimal numbers to equivalent 
pure binary numbers. The sole P;·actical application of the 
al~orithln was in connection witli the programmiug of a 
general purpose digital computer. vVe defined "algorithm" 
as a "procedure for solving a given type of mathematical 
problem," and we concluded that such an a1gorithm, or mathe-
matical formula, is like a 1aw of nature, which cannot be 
the subject of a patent.~ 
V Parker v. Flook, supra, presented a similar situation. The 
claims were drawn to a method for computing an "alarm 
limit." An "alarm limit" is simply a number and the Court 
concluded that the application sought to protect a formula 
for computing this number. Using this formula, the updated 
alarm limit could be calculated if several other variables were· 
known. The application, however, did not purport to ex-
9 The term "algorithm" i& subject to a variety of definitions. The 
Government defines the term to mean : 
"1. A fixed step-by-1;tep procedure for accomplishing a given result ; usu-
ally a simplified procedure for solving a complex problem, also a full state-
ment of a finite number of steps. 2. A defined process or set of rules that 
leads [sic] and assure» development of a de,,ired output from a given· 
input. A sequence of formulas and/ or algebraic/logical steps to calculate 
or determine a given ia,,k ; proce,;,,ing rules." 
This definition i,, .:;igniticantly broader than the definition thi:i Court em-
ployed in Benson and Flook . Our previou" deci,,ions regarding the pa-
tentability of "algorithm,," are nece&;arily limited to the more narrow 
definition employed by the Court and we do not pa,;:, judgment on whether · 
proce1:,ses falling out::;ide the definition previously utilized by this Court, 
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plain how these other variables were to be determined,1° nor 
did it purport "to contain any disclosure relating to the chemi-
cal processes at work, the monitoring of process variables, or 
the means of setting off an alarm system. All that is_pro-
vided is a formula for _£Omputins; ..an updated alarm limit." 
437""'tj_ S. , at 586. 
In contrast, the respondents here do not seek to patent a 
mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent protection 
for a 'process" of curing _§ynt,lietic ll!bber. Their process ad-
mittedly employs a wellkriown mafuematical equation, but 
they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. 
Rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the use of that 
equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their 
claimed process. These include installing rubber in a press, 
closing the mold, constantly determining the temperature of 
the mold, constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time 
through the use of the formula and a digital computer, and 
automatically opening the press at the proper time. Ob-
viously, one does not need a "computer" to cure natural or 
synthetic rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the 
process patent significantly lessens the possibility of "over-
curing" or "undercuring," the process as whole does not 
thereby become unpatentable 1iiatenal. 
Our earlier opinions lend support to our present conclusion 
that a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory 
does not become nonstatutory simply because it utilizes 
a mathematical formula, computer program or digital com-
puter. In Gottschalk v, Benson, supra, we noted "It is said 
10 As we explained in Flook, in order for an operator using the formula 
to calculate an up-dated alarm limit the operator would need to know the 
original ala.mi base, the appropriate margin of ;;afe ty, the time interval that 
should elapse between each updating, the current temperature ( or other 
process variable) and the appropriate weighing fa.ctor to be used t-0 average 
the alarm base and the current temperature, 437 U. S. 584, 586. The 
patent application did not "exµl afo how to ;;elect the approximate margin 
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that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing 
a computer. We do not so hold." 409 U. S., at 71. Simi-
larly, in Parker v. Flook, s·upra, we stated, "A process is not 
unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a 
mathematical algorithm." 437 U. S., at 590. It is now com-
monplace that an application of a law of nature or mathema-
tical formula to a known structure or process may well be 
deserving of patent protection . See, e. g., Funk Bros. Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U. S. 127 (1948) ; Eibel Process Co. v. 
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U. S. 45 (1923); Co-
chrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780 (1876); O'Reilly v. Morse, 
15 How. 62 (1853); and Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156 
(1852) . As Mr. Justice Stone explained four decades ago : 
"While a scientific t ruth , or the mathematical expression 
of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful 
tructure created with the aid of knowlfil!ge of scientific 
t ruth may be." Mackay Radio Corp. & Telegraph Co .. 
~ adio c o;p. of Ameriw ,"306 u. s. 86, 94 (1939).11 
We think this statement in Mackay takes us a long way 
toward the correct answer in this case. Arrhenius' equation 
is not patentable in isolation, but when a process for curing 
rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solu-
t ion of the equation, that process is at the very least not 
barred at the threshold by § 101. 
11 We noted in F-unk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co ., 333 U. S. 127, 130' 
(1948) : 
" He who discovers a hi therto unknown phenomenon of nature has no· 
claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is t,o be an 
invention from ::iuch a discovery, it mu~t come from t he application of the· 
law of nature to a new and useful cud;'' 
Although we were dealing with a " product" claim in Funk Bros., the same· 
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In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed 
process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must 
be considered as a whoJe. It is inappropriate to d issect "the 
cla.uns mto""oia and n~w elements and then to ignore the 
/ presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is par-
ticularly true in a process claim because a new combination 
of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the 
constituents of the combination were well known and in 
common use before the combi11ation was made. The "nov-
elty" of any element or steps in a process, or even of the 
process i tself, is of no relevance in determining whether the 
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of 
possibly patentable subject matter.12 
It has been urged that 11ovelty is an appropriate considera-
tion under § 101. Presumabfy, this argument results from 
the language in § 101 referring to any "new and useful" 
process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general 
statement of the type of subject matter that is eligible for 
patent protection "subject to the comlitions and requirements 
of this title." Specific conditions for patentability follow 
12 It is argued that the proce<lure of di&~ecting a claim into old and new 
elements is mandated by our deci;;ion in Flook which noted that a mathe-
mat ical algorithm must be assumed to be within the "prior art." It is 
from this language that the Government premises its argument that if 
everything other t han the algorithm is determined to be old in the art, 
then the claim cannot recite statutory subject matter. The falla.cy in t his 
argument is that we did not hold in Flook that the mathematical algorithm 
could not be considered at all when making the § 101 determination . To 
accept the analysis proffered by the Government would , if carried to its 
extreme, make all invent.ion;; unpatentable because all invention,; can be re-
duced to underlying principles of nature which, once known , make their 
implementation obviou:, . T he :malysis sugge,;teJ by the Government would 
al::;o undermine our ea rlier decision,; regarding the criteria to consider in 
det.ermining the eligibil ity of a proce::;::; fo r patent protection. See, e. g. , 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (H:)73) ; aJ1cl Cochrane v. Deene,r, 9-i 
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~rhe question ~the refore of whether a particular invention is 
novel is "fully apart from whether the invention falls into a 
category of statutory subject matter." In re Bergey, 596 F. 
2d 952, 961 (CCPA 1979). See also Nickolas v. Peterson, 
580 F . 2d 898 (CA6 1978) . The legislative history of the 
1952 Patent Act is in accord with this reasoning. The Senate 
Report provided: 
"Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be 
patented, 'subject to the conditions and requirement of 
1 3 Sectiou 1W h; titled '·Con<lit.ions for paLentability; novelty and lo:;s 
of right to patent," and provide;,: 
"A person shalI be entitled to a vatent, unlc:;s-
" (a) the invention was known or used by other:; in thi:; country, or 
pntented. or de:;cribed in a printed public,ttion in thi:; or a foreign country, 
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or 
" (b) t he invention was pa.tented or de:-ocribecl in a printed publication it1 
t hi:; or a foreign country or in public use or on :;ale in the country, more 
tlutn one year prior to the date of the applic,ttiou for p,tlent in the United 
States, or 
"(c) he ha,, abandoned the invention, or 
"(cl) t.he invention was fir:;t patented or caused lo be patented, or was 
the :;;ubject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or hi:; legal rep-
resentative:; or w,,;ign:-o in a foreign country prior to the date of the appli-
cation for patent or inventor':; certificate filed more than twelve months 
before the filing of the application in the United Slates, or 
"(e) the invention ww, described in a patent gra11ted on an application for 
p,itent by another filed in t.!1e United State:; before the invention thereof 
by the applicant for pa.tent, or 
' · (f) he did not himself inveni, the subject matter sought to be pa tended, 
or 
"{g) befo re the ,q;plicant':; invention the reof the invention was made in 
this country by anolher who had 11ot, abandoned, suppre:-oseJ, or concealed 
it. Iu determining priority of invention tlrnre ,;hall be con,;iJered not 
only the respective dates of conception and reduction to pra.ctice of the 
invention, but al:;o t he rea.':ionable diligence of one who wa.,; first to conceive 
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this title.' The conditions under which a patent may be 
obtained follow, and Section 102 covers the conditions 
relating to novelty." S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 5 (1952) (emphasis supplied). 
It is later stated in the same report : 
"Section 102, in general, may be said to describe the stat-
utory novelty required for patentability, and includes, in 
eff~, the amplification and definition of 'new' in Section 
IOI." Id., at 6. 
Finally, it is stated in the "Revision Notes": 
"The corresponding sectiou of l the] existing statute is 
split into two sections, Section 101 relating to the subject 
matter for which patents may be obtained, and Section 
102 defining statutory novelty and stating other condi-
tions for patentability." id., at 17. 
See also H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), at 
6, 7, and 17. 
In this case, it may later be determined that the respond-
ents' process is not deserving of patent protection because it 
fails to satisfy the statutory conditions of novelty under § 102 
or nonobviousness under § 103. A rejection on either of these 
grounds does not affect the determination that respondents' 
claims recited subject matter which wa8 eligible for patent 
protection under § 101. 
IV 
We have before us today only the question of whether re-
spondents' cla!ms iaflwtnim the § lUl categories of possibly 
patentable subject matter. We view respondents' claims as 
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products 
and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula. 
We recognize. of course, that when a claim recites a mathe-
matical formula (or scientific principle or phenomenon of 
nature ). an inquiry must be made into whether the claim 
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A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protec-
tion of our patent laws, Gottschalk v. Benson, supra, and 
this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit 
the use of the formula to a particular technological environ-
ment. Parker v. Flook, supra. Similarly, insignificant post-
solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle 
into a patentable process. lbid.14 ·To hold otherwise would 
allow a competent draftsman evade the recognized limita-
tions on the type of subject matter eligible for patent pro-
tection. On the other hand, when a claim containing a 
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a 
structure or process which, when cousidered as a whole, is per-
forming a fuuction which the patent laws were designed to 
14 Arguably, the claim:, in Flook did more than present a mathematical 
fonnula. The claims also solved the calculation in order to produce a new 
number or "alarm limit" and then replaced the old number with the mun-
ber newly produced. The claims covered all uses of the formula in proc-
esses "comprising the catalytic cbemical conversion of hydrocarbons." 
There are numerous such processes in the petrochemical and oil refinery 
industries aud the claims fherefore covered a broad range of potential u::;es. 
437 U. S., at 586. The claims, however, did not cover every conceivable 
application of the formula. We rejected in Flook the argument that be-
cause all po&lible use:l of the mathematical formula were not pre-empted, 
the claim should be eligible for patent protection . Our reasoning in Flook 
is in no way incon:,;istent with our reasoning here. A mathematical for-
mula does uot suddenly become patentable sul.Jject matter simply by hav-
ing the applicant acquie:;ce lo limiting the reach of the patent for the 
formula to a particular t~chnologica.J u::;e . A mathematical formuht in the· 
abst ract it> nonstatutory ::;ubject matter regan.lle:;s of whether the patent is 
intended to cover all u:,;e:,; of the formula or only limited lliies . Sirn.ilarly, a 
m,tthem,.tical formula doe:,; uot become p,ttentable subject mat.ter mere!_ 
by including in t.he claim for the formula token po:st~solution activity :such 
as the type claimed in Flook. We were careful to note in Flook that. tlte 
patent application did nol purport to explain how lhc variables used in 
t he formula were to be selccte<l, nor did the application contain any dis-
c]o:,;ure relating to chemical processei, at work or the means of setting off 
an alarm or adjusting the alnrm limit. 437 U. S., at 586. All the applica-
tion provided wa::; ,t "formula for computing an updated alann "limit.~" 
437 U. S., at 586. 
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protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a dif-
ferent state or thing) , then the claim satisfies the require-
ments of § 101. Because we do not view respondents' claims I 
as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather 
to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber 
products, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals. 
